I. BAR CONTROL
The Supreme Court Nominating Commission is at the center of judicial selection in Kansas.
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1. KAN. CONST. art. 3 § 5. See also KAN. STAT. ANN. § § 20-119 to -125 (2006). 2. The Kansas Constitution provides that: (a) Any vacancy occurring in the office of any justice of the supreme court and any position to be open thereon as a result of enlargement of the court, or the retirement or failure of an incumbent to file his declaration of candidacy to succeed himself as hereinafter required, or failure of a justice to be elected to succeed himself, shall be filled by appointment by the governor of one of three persons possessing the qualifications of office who shall be nominated and whose names shall be submitted to the governor by the supreme court nominating commission established as hereinafter provided.
(b) In event of the failure of the governor to make the appointment within sixty days from the time the names of the nominees are submitted to him, the chief justice of the supreme court shall make the appointment from such nominees. KAN. CONST. art. 3 § 5(a), (b).
In sum, nine states allow the bar to select some of the commission's members and Kansas is the only state in which the bar selects a majority of the commission. By contrast, forty one states either give the bar no official power in the initial 6 selection of supreme court justices or balance the bar's role with power exercised by publicly-elected officials. For example, in Colorado the bar has no role in selecting the nominating commission. 7 In three states, the bar's role is limited to merely suggesting names for a minority of the commission and those suggested do not become commissioners unless approved by the governor and/or legislature. 8 Fifteen states divide the power to appoint supreme court justices among several publicly-elected officials rather than concentrating this power in the governor. In two of these states justices are appointed by the legislature. 9 In thirteen of these states (ten with a nominating commission 10 ) the governor 6 . In some states, interim vacancies (that occur during a justice's uncompleted term) are filled in a different manner from initial vacancies. See Judicial Selection in the States, http://www.ajs.org/js/select.htm (last visited Aug. 16, 2007) . Several states that use elections to fill initial vacancies use nominating commissions to fill interim vacancies. Id. 7. COLO. CONST. art. VI, § § 20, 24 (15 voting members: 7 lawyers appointed through majority action of governor, attorney general, and chief justice, 8 nonlawyers appointed by governor). the speakers also each appoint 1 lawyer not nominated by an organization, each appoint 1 nonlawyer, and jointly appoint a third nonlawyer).
9. These states are: South Carolina and Virginia. See Judicial Selection in the States, http://www.ajs.org/js/select.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2007) . South Carolina uses a nominating commission. S.C. CONST. art. V, § 27; S.C. CODE ANN. § 2-19-10 (2006) (10 members appointed by speaker of house or president of senate, General Assembly may reject all the commission's nominees, but cannot elect a candidate who has not been nominated by commission).
10. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12011.5(b) (West 2007) (commission's "membership . . . shall consist of attorney members and public members with the ratio of public members to attorney members determined, to the extent practical, by the ratio established in Sections 6013.4 and 6013.5 of the Business and Professions Code"); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-44a (2007) (12 members: 3 lawyers appointed by governor, 3 nonlawyers appointed by governor, 3 lawyers, 1 appointed by each senate president, house majority and minority leaders, and 3 nonlawyers, one appointed by each of house speaker, senate majority and minority leaders); Del. Exec. Order No. 4 (Jan. 5, 2001) (9 members: 8 appointed by governor (4 lawyers and 4 nonlawyers) and 1 appointed by president of bar association, with consent of governor); HAW. CONST. art. VI, § § 3-4 (9 members: 2 appointed by governor, 2 by senate president, 2 by house speaker, 1 by chief justice, 2 by state bar, no more than 4 members may be lawyers); Md To recap, more than four-fifths of the states either give the bar no official power in the initial selection of supreme court justices or balance the bar's role with power exercised by publicly-elected officials. These states generally select their justices through:
(1) appointment by the legislature, (2) confirmation of the governor's nominees by the legislature, 14 or (3) elections in which a lawyer's vote is worth no more than any other citizen's vote.
where all candidates appear with party labels on the ballot and the top two vote getters compete in the general election), New Mexico, Pennsylvania (if more than one seat is available all candidates run at large and the top two vote getters fill the open seats), Texas, and West Virginia. See Judicial Selection in the States, http://www.ajs.org/js/select.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2007 Less than one-fifth of states allow the bar to select members of a nominating commission that has the power to ensure that one of its initial nominees becomes a justice. 15 And Kansas alone allows the bar to select a majority of such a commission.
II. DOES SECRECY YIELD MERIT?
While the President nominates federal judges, these judges are not confirmed without a majority vote of the United States Senate 16 and these votes on the confirmation of federal judges have long been public.
17
In contrast, the votes of the Kansas Supreme Court Nominating Commission are secret, as are the Commission's interviews of applicants. 18 The public can learn of the pool of applicants and the three chosen by the Commission, but cannot discover which commissioners voted for or against which applicants.
19
By statute, the Commission "may act only by the concurrence of a majority of its members."
20 But no statute requires that the votes of the Commission be made public. 21 15. The importance of this power was recently demonstrated in Missouri where the governor publicly considered the possibility of refusing to appoint any of the three nominees submitted to him by the supreme court nominating commission. See Editorial, Blunt Trauma, WALL ST. J., Sept. 17, 2007, at A16. The governor ultimately did appoint one of the nominees and his capitulation to the commission has been explained by the fact that if he did not appoint one of those three then the commission would exercise its power to appoint one of the three. Id. By contrast, the commission lacks this power to ensure that one of its nominees becomes a justice where appointment requires confirmation by the legislature of other publicly-elected officials. The body with the power to withhold confirmation has the power to send the commission "back to the drawing board" to identify additional nominees if none of the original nominees wins confirmation.
16 Defenders of this largely-secret system describe it as "non-partisan" or "merit" selection, 22 and contend that it selects applicants based on their merits rather than their politics.
23
There is, however, a remarkable pattern of governors appointing to the Commission members of the governor's political party. Research for this paper examined the twenty-year period from 1987 to 2007. During this period, twenty-two people appointed by the governor served on the Commission. In all twenty-two cases, the governor appointed a member of the governor's party. 24 This is depicted in In addition to consistently partisan appointments to the Commission, there is a strikingly partisan record of appointments to the Supreme Court itself. During the twenty-year period from 1987 to 2007, eleven new justices were appointed to the court. 25 Nine of the eleven justices belonged to the same political party as the governor who appointed them. 26 In one of the other two cases the governor could not appoint a justice from his party because none of the three individuals submitted to the governor belonged to that party. 27 In other words, in nine of the ten cases in which the governor could pick a member of the governor's party, the governor did so. So the governor's rolein this allegedly "non-partisan" process-has been quite partisan, although not invariably so. 28 And in one of the last eleven cases, the Commission forced the governor to select an individual who did not belong to the governor's party.
29
This data on the appointment of justices is depicted in 
III. THE DEBATE OVER REFORM
There is a nationwide debate over whether "non-partisan," "merit" selection of judges should be reformed to achieve two goals: first, to reduce the amount of control exercised by the bar, and, second, to subject the political side of the judicial selection process to a more public system of checks and balances.
30 This paper provides a brief history of selection to the Kansas Supreme Court before discussing possible reforms. (1995) . Accordingly, the case for reforming this process applies to all these courts but it applies most strongly to the Kansas Supreme Court simply because it is the state's highest court and lower courts follow its precedents.
A. The 1958 Kansas Plan
A resolution for the submission of a constitutional amendment which would adopt the commission plan [for the selection of supreme court justices] was introduced in 1953, but defeated in the house judiciary committee. Again proposed in 1955, the resolution was defeated in the senate judiciary committee. However, subsequent events were to lead to the adoption of the commission plan for the selection of supreme court justices: The intensive lobbying efforts of the Kansas Bar Association; and public outcry over the infamous "triple play" of 1956.
The "triple play" involved Chief Justice of Kansas Supreme Court Bill Smith, Governor Fred Hall, and Lieutenant Governor John McCuish. In 1956, Governor Hall was defeated in the Republican Primary by Warren Shaw, who then lost the general election to Democrat George Docking. In December of that year, Chief Justice Smith, who was seriously ill, forwarded his resignation to Governor Hall. Hall then immediately resigned his post of Governor in favor of Lieutenant Governor McCuish, who prematurely returned from a Newton Hospital to make his first and only official act of his 11 day tenure as Governor: The appointment of Hall to the supreme court. Such a result would have been avoided under the commission plan, as the nominating commission would have determined which candidates to send to the governor for appointment, rather than allowing the governor to appoint replacement justices in between elections.
The legislature submitted a proposal to amend the constitution to adopt the commission plan for the selection of supreme court justices only, and this amendment was passed by a wide margin in the 1958 general election.
31
In short, the current Commission system was rejected in 1953 and 1955 butafter the "triple play" of 1956-was passed in the next general election. The "intensive lobbying efforts of the Kansas Bar Association" combined with the "triple play" to give Kansas its current supreme court selection process.
The lesson of the "triple play" is that governors should not have absolute power over the selection of supreme court justices. "Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely." 32 The Framers of the United States Constitution were acutely aware of this risk and their masterful achievement was designing a system of government in which power was divided and constrained by a system of checks and balances. 33 In appointing justices to the United States Supreme Court, the president's power is checked by the power of the United States Senate. The Constitution requires a majority vote of the Senate in order to confirm a justice to the United States Supreme Court. 34 By contrast, at the time of the "triple play" the Kansas Constitution lacked this check on the Governor's power to appoint a justice to the Kansas Supreme Court.
Anger over the "triple play" prompted the addition of a check on the governor's power to select justices. This new check on the governor's power was given, not to the Kansas Senate, but to the bar (lawyers licensed to practice in the state). Rather than following the United States Constitution to make the Legislature the check on the Executive's power, the 1958 change made the bar the check on the Executive's power.
35

B. Is The Bar an Interest Group or "Faction"?
Lawyers, because of their professional expertise and interest in the judiciary, are well-suited to recognizing which candidates for a judgeship are especially knowledgeable and skilled lawyers. But lawyers assessing applicants for a judgeship are also human beings. Can we be confident that all the lawyers on a nominating commission will be willing and able to put aside completely all their personal views in favor of some non-political conception of "merit"? Scholars who have studied judicial nominating commissions around the United States conclude that the commissions are very political, but that their politics-rather than being the politics of the citizenry as a wholeare "a somewhat subterranean politics of bar and bench involving little popular control." 36 34. U.S. CONST. art II, § 2. 35. Technically, of course, it is the Commission rather than the bar that is the check on the governor. But the governor appoints four of the nine commissioners so, except insofar as they are holdovers appointed by a previous governor of a different party, those four are unlikely to serve as much of a check on the governor. The check on the governor, if it comes from the Commission at all, is more likely to come from the five commissioners elected by the bar. See supra Part II, Table 2 (showing, from [F]ar from taking judicial selection out of politics, the Missouri Plan actually tended to replace Politics, wherein the judge faces popular election (or selection by a popularly elected official), with a somewhat subterranean politics of bar and bench involving little popular control. There is, then, a sense in which merit selection does operate to enhance the weight of professional influence in the selection process (one of its stated goals) in that lawyers and judges are given a direct, indeed official, role in the nominating process. On close examination, however, one finds raw political considerations masquerading as professionalism , do not work as advertised, and if the plan in general cannot be shown to produce superior judges, what is left of the argument? The answer is, not much. In a thorough examination of the Missouri Plan undertaken by Henry Glick, other avenues of analysis were pursued, but the results in no instance reveal redeeming support for the claims made for merit selection. Why, then does bar, bench, and general public support for the plan continue, and why is the plan being adopted in more and more states? The specific reasons are many, but they ultimately boil down to an aggrandizement of national and state bar associations.
The legal profession desires a larger voice in judicial selection for the same reason that other interest groups do-to advance their cause through judicial policymaking. "Merit" selection gives them that added leverage. All the better if they can sell their old line of increased political influence over the courts by using the attractive, but phony, label of "neutral professionalism." ("This review of social scientific research on merit selection systems does not lend much credence to proponents' claims that merit selection insulates judicial selection from political forces, makes judges accountable to the public, and identifies judges who are substantially different from judges chosen through other systems. Evidence shows that many nominating commissioners have held political and public offices and political considerations figure into at least some of their deliberations. Bar associations are able to influence the process through identifying commission members and evaluating judges . . . . Finally, there are no significant, systematic differences between merit-selected judges and other judges."); HARRY P. STUMPF & JOHN H. CULVER, THE POLITICS OF STATE COURTS 41 (1991) ("The primary appeal of the merit plan for judicial selection rests with the implication that it is a nonpartisan mechanism. Additionally, proponents claim that judges of a higher 'quality' are more likely to reach the bench via this system than any other. However, experience with the merit plan indicates that it is a very political one, with state and local bar politics substituting for public politics.").
Practicing lawyers and judges confirm the scholars' conclusion. Critics of "merit" selection point out that lawyers comprise an interest group just like other interest groups. Bar associations aggressively lobby for the interests of their lawyer-members. While they may articulate reasons why the policies that favor lawyers also serve the public interest, bar associations have repeatedly advocated policies that favor lawyers and that have been viewed by others as harming the public as a whole. 39 The selection of supreme court justices through a process controlled by the bar is just one example of this form of advocacy. 40 Relatedly, members of the Kansas Supreme Court Nominating Commission could be lobbied and influenced by some of that lobbying. 41 politics out of the judicial selection process. It merely changes the nature of the political process involved. It substitutes bar and elitist politics for those of the electorate as a whole.").
39. See, e.g., DEBORAH L. RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE 69 (2004) ("Bar efforts to restrain lawyers' competitive practices have inflated the costs and reduced the accessibility of legal assistance. Although the courts have increasingly curtailed these efforts through constitutional rulings, the bar's regulatory structure has remained overly responsive to professional interests at the expense of the pubic."); id. at 87 ("Giving qualified nonlawyers a greater role in providing routine legal assistance is likely to have a . . . positive effect, but the organized bar is pushing hard in the opposite direction. Rev. 531, 567 (1994) ("the organized bar, beginning in the 1930s, negotiated treaties with organized groups of competitors that had the effect of dividing the market for services in areas reserved for lawyers, on the one hand, and accountants, architects, claims adjusters, collection agencies, liability insurance companies, lawbook publishers, professional engineers, realtors, title companies, trust companies, and social workers, on the other. The growth of the consumer movement and the evolution of federal antitrust law brought an end to this market division strategy.") id. at 575 (discussing organized bar's opposition to group legal service arrangements).
40 The Framers of the United States Constitution recognized a danger from interest groups, or "factions" as they were then called 42 The Federalist Papers propose several cures for the "mischiefs of faction." 43 The most famous is the system of "checks and balances," which divides power and sets factions against one another, ensuring that none can gain control for itself. 44 The question is whether such a system is in place in Kansas: are the critics correct that the process for judicial selection gives too much control to a single faction? The executive branch's power to appoint members of the judicial branch is checked, not by the legislative branch, but by a nine-person commission in which a majority are selected by the bar.
C. Reduce Bar Control of the Nominating Commission?
Several possible reforms would reduce the control a single faction, the bar, has over the process of selecting justices to the Kansas Supreme Court. One such reform would simply reduce the portion of the Commission selected by the bar. The majority of the twenty-four states with supreme court nominating commissions allow the bar to select less than one-third of the commission's members. 45 Kansas could move toward the mainstream of states by, for instance, allowing the Speaker of the House and President of the Senate constituents, whether those constituents speak individually or collectively through organizations. Such information, however, should be properly channeled to the commission as an entity and not to individual commissioners by way of surreptitious meetings or ex parte communications. Id. at 100-01. In Kansas, House Speaker Melvin Neufeld said the bar played too large a role and the system needs to be reformed so a Governor's nominee to the high court faces Senate confirmation. See Tim Carpenter, Appeals Court Judge Named to High Court, TOPEKA CAPITAL-JOURNAL, Jan. 6, 2007, at A1. Neufeld said, "That setup that we now have has evolved to a good-old-boy club." Id.
A "good-old-boy club," with its associations of exclusivity and privilege, is an apt description of how the Commission looks to many of those who are not members of the bar. This is a shame because of the good faith and hard work exhibited by those the bar elects to the Commission. But when a single interest group controls an important governmental process --and exercises that control in a largely secret manner --outsiders can be excused for being suspicious and resentful. Courts have held such interest-group control unconstitutional when the interest group in question were not lawyers. See Senator Susan Wagle, Confirm Justices, WICHITA EAGLE, Mar. 6, 2005, at 15A ("The nominating committee is controlled by a majority of attorneys, the very individuals who appear before the courts seeking favor. In a similar situation in 1993, the federal courts declared the process by which Kansas selected its secretary of agriculture unconstitutional. The secretary used to be selected by the farm groups that the secretary regulated. The Legislature changed the position to one selected by the governor and subject to the Senate confirmation process.").
42. to select two commissioners each, while the bar and Governor select three and two commissioners, respectively. In addition to moving Kansas toward the mainstream of states with respect to bar control, this reform would also bring Kansas in line with the ten states in which the legislature selects some of the commissioners or has confirmation power over those the governor selects.
46
According to Professor (and former judge) Joseph Colquitt, allowing the legislature to select some of the commissioners "diverts the power from the governor, who usually will be charged with appointing judges from the slate nominated by the commission. Placing the power to appoint or elect commissioners in hands other than the appointing authority for judges better addresses both democratic ideals and commission-independence concerns." 47 A reform to allow the Kansas Legislature to appoint members of the Kansas Supreme Court Nominating Commission would reduce the bar's control over the Kansas Supreme Court selection process. But, it would not open up the process by exposing the commissioners' votes to the public. It is possible to require that the votes of the Commission be made public-so everyone can learn which commissioners voted for or against which applicants-but most judicial nominating commissions around the country vote in secret. 48 Other ways to expose the political side of the judicial selection process include judicial elections and senate confirmation of judicial nominees. These are discussed next.
D. Electing Supreme Court Justices
Kansans elected supreme court justices prior to 1958 and a recent proposal in the Legislature sought to revive this process. 49 While electing supreme court justices reduces bar control, it also has many drawbacks. These include:
the appearance of impropriety caused by judges taking money from those who appear before them, the threat to judicial independence resulting from a judge's dependence on campaign contributions and party support, the reduced perception of impartiality caused by statements of judicial candidates on political or social issues, the elimination of qualified lawyers (2002) . The possibility of contributors "buying justice" in individual cases is the primary concern about judicial elections. The possibility of contributors "buying policy" over a range of cases is a secondary concern and one that raises more nuanced issues. No plausible system of judicial selection can be completely insulated from the efforts of interest groups to influence policy. Even the federal system of judicial appointment with life tenure is subject to these efforts as interest 56 In 2006, it did go to a vote in the Senate. A 22-17 majority of senators voted for it, but that was still five votes short of the two-thirds necessary for a constitutional amendment. 57 In both 2006 and 2007, Representative Lance Kinzer proposed abolition of the Supreme Court Nominating Commission. Instead, justices would be nominated by the governor and appointed to the Supreme Court after groups contribute to the presidential and senatorial campaigns of candidates likely to appoint and confirm the judges expected to advance the interest group's preferred policy positions. The difference between the federal system and a system of electing judges is that in the federal system interest-group influence over judge-made policy is indirect because it operates through the president and senators and these intermediaries campaign on a range of issues besides judicial selection. See id. By contrast, judicial selection is the only issue in judicial campaigns so interest-group influence over judge-made policy is more direct in a system of elected judges. See infra text accompanying notes 77-78 (contrasting political theory behind judicial elections with that behind federal system of judicial selection 57. See KAN. CONST. art. XIV, § § 1-2. An amendment to the constitution can originate in either house. It must then be approved by two-thirds of the members of each house, and then at the next or through a special election the majority of voters must approve. A revision can also occur through constitutional convention to revise all or part of the document. Each house must approve this by a two-thirds vote. At the following election the majority of voters must approve the convention. At the next (or a special) election, delegates are elected from each district. After meeting and reaching consensus, the proposals of the convention are submitted to the voters for majority approval. See id.
E. Senate Confirmation of Supreme Court Justices
2008]
WARE: SUPREME COURT SELECTION 403 confirmation by the Senate. 58 This proposal is similar to the process used in three states and at the federal level.
59
This proposal was the subject of committee hearings, 60 but did not receive a vote of the full House.
61
The push for Senate confirmation came shortly after two controversial Kansas Supreme Court decisions, one on school finance and the other on the death penalty. 62 This timing led many people to view the push for Senate confirmation as, to use the words of Senator John Vratil, "an overreaction to our discontent with two decisions." 63 According to this view, the process for selecting justices should not be amended just because many people disagree with a couple of the court's decisions. As Senator Vratil said, "We need to take a much longer viewpoint and not just react in knee-jerk fashion to a couple of decisions that are unpopular." 64 So the question is, when taking the long view, did the Framers of the United States Constitution get it right? They created three co-equal branches of government (executive, legislative and judicial) and a system of checks and balances that has stood the test of time longer than any other written constitution in human history.
65
A cardinal virtue of the United States Constitution is that, at crucial points, each branch is checked by both of the other two branches. For example, a member of the judicial branch is nominated by the executive and confirmed by the legislature. 66 These checks come from elected officials, responsible to the public as a whole, not a single interest group or "faction." Also, these checks take the form of public votes. As a result, citizens can hold their president and senators accountable for these important decisions on election day. 67 Id. In addition, the United States Constitution promotes accountability by placing the appointment responsibility solely on the president, the individual in whom executive power is vested. By contrast, Kansas currently spreads that responsibility among the governor and the nine-member Commission. As John McGinnis explains: Nominating Commission's votes are secret. Consequently, even the few privileged citizens entitled to vote for commissioners cannot hold them individually accountable for these important decisions.
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IV. OPPOSITION TO SENATE CONFIRMATION
Officials of the Kansas Bar Association defend Kansas' current system of Supreme Court selection and resist reform. 69 In addition to arguing (as discussed above) that the current system emphasizes merit rather than politics, 70 they have argued that Senate confirmation would be a "circus."
71
The principal concern of the Framers regarding the Appointment Clause, as in many of the other separation of powers provisions of the Constitution, was to ensure accountability while avoiding tyranny. to alter the appointment process. 'I think that the system that we've had in place for a number of years has worked extremely well,' she said. 'I think the system works.'"); Klepper, supra note 53 (responding to a proposal for Senate confirmation, "Supreme Court spokesman Ron Keefover said the court is happy with the current method of selection.").
70. Is this war-like vision of battling senators and wounded justices likely to occur if Kansas adopts senate confirmation? To assess that, one can look to the experience of the twelve states that have senate confirmation or confirmation by a similar popularly-elected body. 73 Research for this paper examined the last two votes for initial supreme court confirmation in each of these twelve states. 74 In all twenty-four of these cases, the governor's nominee was confirmed. In nearly eighty percent of these cases, the vote in favor of confirmation was unanimous. 75 In only two of these twenty four cases was there more than a single dissenting vote. 76 These facts provide little support for the view that senate confirmation of state supreme court justices tends to produce a circus, let alone a war.
The opposite concern about senate confirmation is that it is merely a rubber stamp so governors routinely appoint whoever they want. There are indications, however, that-rather than acting as a rubber stamp-senate confirmation may be a deterrent. Governors know that senate confirmation of controversial nominees may be difficult, 77 75. Seventeen of the twenty-four votes were unanimous and two were effectively unanimous because they were voice votes with no tally recorded.
76. See infra Appendix B. 77. The Founders recognized that Senate confirmation would deter the executive from controversial nominees. As Alexander Hamilton wrote, "The necessity of [Senate] concurrence would have a powerful though in general, a silent operation. It would be an excellent check upon a spirit of favoritism in the President, and would tend greatly to preventing the appointment of the wishes of the senate in deciding who to nominate. 78 Of course, whether this generalization is accurate or not, ultimate responsibility for the tenor of the senate confirmation process rests on the senators themselves. Similarly, ultimate responsibility for the outcome of the senate confirmation processwhether a nominee is confirmed or not-also rests with the senators who are accountable to the citizens on election day.
In short, senate confirmation makes judicial selection accountable to the people. It does so without judicial elections, which embody the passion for direct democracy prevalent in the Jacksonian era. 79 Rather, senate confirmation exemplifies the republicanism of our Nation's Founders. The Framers of the United States Constitution devised a system of indirect democracy in which the structure of government mediates and cools the momentary passions of popular majorities. 80 Senate confirmation strives to make judicial selection accountable to the people while protecting the judiciary against the possibility that the people may act rashly.
V. JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
In defending Kansas' current system for selecting justices, some members of the bar suggest that Senate confirmation would reduce the independence of the Kansas Supreme Court. 80. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 49-52 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed. 1999) (for Madison's classic distinction between republics and democracies). The Framers "understood that despotism of the many could be as dangerous to government and to individual liberty as despotism of the few, and they designed their democracy to ensure against both evils. The Framers' fear of majority faction is evident: their constitution is countermajoritarian in numerous respects. The document clearly is founded in part on permitting and expecting the populace to speak through its elected representatives. By the same token, the Constitution is shot through with provisions that in effect might defeat the decisions of a popular majority." Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577, 619-20 (1993) (footnotes omitted).
81. See, e.g., Memorandum from Jim Robinson to House Committee on the Judiciary (Feb. 6, 2005), available at http://www.kadc.org/Testimony/Robinson_JudicialSelection.pdf ("Senate confirmation introduces a political element into the selection process that diminishes judicial independence.").
2008]
WARE: SUPREME COURT SELECTION 407 courts. All seem to agree that federal judges enjoy a tremendous degree of independence because they have life tenure. 82 By contrast, judges who are subject to reelection or reappointment have less independence because they are accountable to those with the power to reelect or reappoint them. Judicial independence is primarily determined, not by the system of judicial selection, but by the system of judicial retention, including the length of a justice's term. 83 The current system of judicial retention for the Kansas Supreme Court is as follows. When first appointed, a justice holds office for a short initial term. 84 To remain on the bench, a justice must stand for retention at the next general election which occurs after one year in office and, if retained in that election, must stand for retention every six years thereafter. 85 In these retention elections, the justice does not face an opposing candidate; instead, the voters' choose simply to retain or reject that particular justice. 86 A justice must retire at the end of the term during which the justice reaches the age of 70.
87
This system of judicial retention is perfectly compatible with a judicial selection process that includes senate confirmation. Three states combine retention elections with initial selection through confirmation by the senate or other publicly-elected officials. 2006) ("Any judge upon reaching age 75 shall retire, except that any duly elected or appointed justice of the supreme court shall retire upon reaching age 70. Upon retiring, each such judge as described in this subsection shall receive retirement annuities as provided in K.S.A. 20-2610 and amendments thereto, except, that when any justice of the supreme court attains the age of 70, such judge may, if such judge desires, finish serving the term during which such judge attains the age of 70.").
88. These states are California, Maryland and Utah. See CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 16 (retention election every 12 years), MD. CONST. art. IV, § 5A (retention election every 10 years), confirmation in Kansas argue that there is no need to change our state's system of judicial retention. 89 The balance Kansas has struck between judicial independence and judicial accountability is quite reasonable and well within the national mainstream. 90 If, however, greater judicial independence was desired, Kansas could extend the length of a justice's term (the time between retention elections) or even abolish retention elections altogether so justices could serve until reaching the mandatory retirement age. On the other hand, if greater judicial accountability was desired then Kansas could reduce the length of a justice's term.
VI. CONCLUSION
The bar has an unusually high degree of control over the selection of supreme court justices in Kansas. None of the other forty nine states gives the bar as much control. To move Kansas from this extreme position toward the mainstream, several possible reforms have been debated in recent years. The least ambitious reform would merely change the composition of the Kansas Supreme Court Nominating Commission. Rather than allowing the bar to select a majority of the Commission's members, some of those members could, instead, be selected by the Kansas Legislature. While this would reduce the amount of control the bar has over the judicial selection process, it would not open up the process by exposing the commissioners' votes to the public. Other states open the judicial selection process to the public by using judicial elections or senate confirmation of judicial nominees. Proposals to elect supreme court justices have received little support in Kansas in recent years. By contrast, proposals to institute senate confirmation have received significant support in the Kansas Legislature. Senate confirmation would both reduce the amount of control the bar has over the judicial selection process and open up that process to a more public system of checks and balances. The worry that senate confirmation in Kansas would be a political "circus" or a "battle" finds little support in the experience of the many states that use senate UTAH CONST. art. VIII, § 9 (retention elections every ten years •The Commission recommends that the governor appoint judges from a pool of judicial aspirants whose qualifications have been reviewed and approved by a credible, neutral, nonpartisan, diverse deliberative body or commission.
•The Commission recommends that judicial appointees serve a single, lengthy term of at least 15 years or until a specified age and not be subject to a reselection process.
154 Judges so appointed should be entitled to retirement benefits upon completion of judicial service.
•The Commission recommends that judges not otherwise subject to reselection, nonetheless, remain subject to regular judicial performance evaluations and disciplinary processes that include removal for misconduct.
The American Bar Association has long supported appointivebased or so-called "merit selection" systems for the selection of state judges, and in the Commission's view, rightly so, for several reasons. First, the administration of justice should not turn on the outcome of popularity contests. If we accept the enduring principles identified in the first section of this report, then a good judge is a competent and conscientious lawyer with a judicial temperament who is independent enough to uphold the law impartially without regard to whether the results will be politically popular with voters. Second, initial appointment reduces the corrosive influence of money in judicial selection by sparing candidates the need to solicit contributions from individuals and organizations with an interest in the cases the candidates will decide as judges. Some argue that in appointive systems, campaign contributions are simply redirected from judicial candidates to the appointing governors, but that is an important difference because it is the money that flows directly from contributors to judicial candidates that gives rise to a perception of dependence. Third, the escalating cost of running judicial campaigns operates to exclude from the pool of viable candidates those of limited financial means who lack access to contributors with significant financial resources. The potential impact of this development on efforts to diversify the bench is especially troublesome. Fourth, the prospect of soliciting contributions from special interests and being 154. The American Bar Association House of Delegates adopted a recommendation stating, "Judicial appointees should serve until a specified age. publicly pressured to take positions on issues they must later decide as judges threatens to discourage many capable and qualified people from seeking judicial office. For these and other reasons upon which the ABA has relied in the past, the Commission believes that judges should initially be selected by appointment.
Consistent with an earlier recommendation in this Report, the Commission likewise recommends that an independent deliberative body evaluate the qualifications of all judicial aspirants and that candidates eligible for nomination to judicial office be limited to those who have been approved by such a body. In grounding its support for appointive judiciaries on the principle that the viability of a would-be judge's candidacy should not turn on her or his political popularity, the Commission does not mean to suggest that appointive systems are apolitical. Any method of judicial selection will inevitably be political because judges decide issues of intense social, cultural, economic, and political interest to the public and the other branches of government. In this inherently political environment, however, the requirement that independent commissions review the qualifications of and approve all would-be judges provides a safety net to assure that all nominees possess the baseline capabilities, credentials, and temperament needed to be excellent judges.
Despite the occasional tendency to regard "politics" as a bad word, at its root, politics refers to the process by which citizens govern themselves. In that regard, it is not only inevitable but also perhaps even desirable that judicial selection have a "political" aspect to ensure that would-be judges are acceptable to the people they serve. Because judges, by virtue of their need to remain independent and impartial, serve a role in government that is fundamentally different from that of other public officials, the Commission has recommended against the use of elections as a means to ensure public acceptability.
The Commission did, however, consider another possibility: legislative confirmation of gubernatorial appointments. Requiring that judges be approved by an independent commission and both political branches of government could conceivably increase public confidence in the judges at the point of initial selection and serve as a form of prospective accountability that reduces the need for resorting to more problematic reselection processes later. A majority of the Commission ultimately decided, however, not to recommend legislative confirmation as a component of its preferred selection system. The protracted and combative confirmation process in the federal system, coupled with the highly politicized relationship between governors and legislators in many states, has led the Commission not to recommend such an approach.
The last of the Commission's recommendations with respect to the selection system it regards as optimal is that states not employ reselection processes. Discussions of judicial selection often overlook a distinction that the Commission regards as absolutely critical, between initial selection and reselection. When nonincumbents run for judicial office in contested elections, the threat that elections pose to their future independence and impartiality-though extant-is limited. Granted, nonincumbent candidates can be made to appear beholden either to their contributors, to positions they took on the campaign trail, or more generally to the electoral majority responsible for selecting them. But unlike incumbent judges, first-time judicial office seekers are not at risk of being removed from office because they made rulings of law that did not sit well with voters.
A similar point can be made with respect to judges initially selected by appointment. The process by which those candidates are first chosen may be partisan and political, and some judges may feel a lingering allegiance to whoever appointed them. But they are not put in danger of losing jobs they currently hold on account of judicial decisions made in those positions.
In the Commission's view, the worst selection-related judicial independence problems arise in the context of judicial reselection. It is then that judges who have declared popular laws unconstitutional, rejected constitutional challenges to unpopular laws, upheld the claims of unpopular litigants, or rejected the claims of popular litigants are subject to loss of tenure as a consequence. And it is then that judges may feel the greatest pressure to do what is politically popular rather than what the law requires. Public confidence in the courts is, in turn, undermined to the extent that judicial decisions made in the shadow of upcoming elections are perceived-rightly or wrongly-as motivated by fear of defeat.
The problems with reselection may be most common in contested reelection campaigns but are at risk of occurring in any reselection process-electoral or otherwise. Thus, for example, the issue arises in states that delegate the task of judicial reselection to legislatures, whose enactments judges are to interpret and, if unconstitutional, invalidate. For that reason, the Commission recommends against resort to reselection processes.
While the Commission recommends that judges be appointed to the bench without the possibility of subsequent reappointment, reelection, or retention election, the Commission has remained flexible as to the optimal length of a judge's term of office. Most states that appoint judges without the possibility of subsequent reselection cap judicial terms at a specified age. States could also set judicial terms at a fixed number of years. In either case, however, it is important that states take pains to preserve judicial retirement benefits because judicial office will lose its appeal to the best and brightest lawyers if judges are obligated to conclude judicial service before their If states opt for a single term, it is important that the term be of considerable length-at least fifteen or more years-for several reasons. First, there are obvious advantages that flow from experience on the bench that will be lost if judges are confined to short terms of office. Second, the most qualified candidates for judge will often be lawyers with very successful private practices that they may be reluctant to abandon if they are obligated to return to practice after only a few years on the bench. Third, to the extent that lawyers view judicial service as the culmination of their legal careers and not simply as a temporary detour from private practice, short terms may discourage younger lawyers from seeking judicial office. Fourth, insofar as judges are obligated to reenter the job market at the conclusion of their judicial service, their independence from prospective employers who appear before them as lawyers and litigants in the waning years of their judicial terms may become a concern.
In earlier recommendations, the Commission urged that systems of judicial discipline be actively enforced and that regular and comprehensive judicial evaluation programs be instituted. These recommendations are critically important to ensuring accountability in a system that does not rely on reselection processes. All states have procedures for judicial removal, typically including but not limited to those subsumed by the disciplinary process.
The Commission believes that judges must be removable for cause to preserve the institutional legitimacy of the courts. It is beyond the scope of this report to describe in detail the nature and extent of "for cause" removal. By way of general guidance, however, the Commission points to the enduring principles discussed in the first part of this report. An overriding goal of our system of justice is to uphold the rule of law. Judges should never be subject to removal for upholding the law as they construe it to be written, even when they are in error, for then the judge's decision-making independence-so essential to safeguarding the rule of law in the long run-will be undermined. On the other hand, we do not want judges who are so independent that they are utterly unaccountable to the rule of law they have sworn to uphold. Thus, judges who disregard the rule of law altogether by taking bribes or committing other crimes that undermine public confidence in the courts should be removed. One could reach a similar conclusion with respect to judges who, despite the best efforts of nominating commissions to weed out unqualified candidates, manifest an utter lack of the competence, character, or temperament requisite to upholding the law impartially.
